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ABSTRACT 
Multinational financial institutions (MFIs) are subject to strong isomorphic pressures 
from the institutional environment. MFIs need to assess appropriate approaches to 
comply with the desired behaviour of the foreign subsidiaries in the host country 
societies, without jeopardizing the desired behaviour of the parent company in the home 
country societies. Therefore, identification of organizational boundaries and developing 
trust through managing boundary permeability is critical to MFIs. Our results show that 
restoring trust at all levels of the global financial system is widely recognized as a 
priority by managers of MFIs, through a range of self-imposed measures and 
supervisory enforcement of globally coordinated regulations. Further, active 
management of boundary permeability that determines the degree of isomorphism with 
host country societies can assist MFIs in fostering legitimacy in both home and host 
countries. We propose a framework that structures the analysis of the formal and 
informal rules in the institutional context, including government policy, legal system, 
cultural dimensions and social capital. 
Keywords: MFIs, isomorphism, intracorporate isomorphism, boundary permeability, 
management control, trust 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial and economic crisis prompted a public debate on the 
functioning of the global financial system and the relevance of trust (Asmussen, 2012; 
Brown, 2009; Roth, 2009; Trichet, 2010; Tumpel-Gugerell, 2008; Wells and Gostelow, 
2009). At the core of the debate are the roles played by the multinational financial 
institutions (MFIs) and their relationships with the customers on the one hand and the 
public on the other. Relationships are in essence built on trust because of relational risks 
inherent in transactions (Nooteboom, 2007). High levels of trust help reduce transaction 
costs (Howorth and Moro, 2006). Relationships that are not based upon trust, but on 
rules and regulations result in increased transaction costs since they need to be 
negotiated and agreed upon, and if necessary enforced based upon a legal framework 
(Fukuyama, 1995). Increased transaction costs are detrimental to business and economic 
growth. Governments across the world have formulated policies and implemented 
regulatory reforms, while the importance of trust in the financial system for the global 
economy is a concern at supranational level. The G20 and Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) recognize that mutual trust is required in the capability of local regulatory 
authorities to implement common regulatory standards (Carney, 2014; G20, 2014).  
The institutional context in which MFIs operate has significantly changed, 
including the rules of the game on human interaction, which can be prohibited or 
permitted under specific conditions (North, 1990). In order to prosper in the changed 
business environment, MFIs need to better understand the new regulations and increase 
internal and external commitments by incorporating, through isomorphic mechanisms, 
the patterns of change that are considered legitimate for the specific environment 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1991). MFIs are subject to strong 
isomorphic pressures from the institutional environment. According to Powell (1988) 
this type of environment requires “skilful management of boundary relations and 
conformity to the normative codes of the relational networks in which it participates” 
(cited Westney, 2005: 61). Effective boundary management aims to ensure a “fit 
between its [an organization’s] internal structures and processes and the characteristics 
of its environment” (Ghoshal and Westney, 2005: 8). Further, since multinational 
corporations (MNCs) operate in several countries, the institutional context differs for 
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each host country (Ghoshal and Westney, 2005; Westney, 2005). MNC subsidiaries are 
subject to formal and informal isomorphic forces from both the parent company, as well 
as the societies in which they operate (Birkinshaw, 2000; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
Contingency-based research on MNCs provides analytical frameworks to assess 
alignment of MNCs’ strategies and behaviour with their business environments both at 
parent company level in the home country, as well as foreign subsidiary level in the host 
countries (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2002; Chenhall, 2003; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Prahalad and Doz, 1987). In line with institutional and contingency theories, MFIs need 
to assess the most appropriate approach to be considered legitimate in both home and 
host countries. Das and Teng (1998: 494, italic added) regard this kind of behaviour as 
“desired behavior” which can enhance trust relationships. For MFIs to build and 
develop trust with external stakeholders, identification and management of 
organizational boundaries is important. Boundary permeability, as a particular structural 
property of organizational dynamics, helps MFIs to improve their management of 
isomorphism, as boundaries “exert a centripetal force on the entity [MFI] in order to 
hold the system together” and simultaneously “exert a centrifugal force on the entity by 
allowing the system to come apart enough to receive input from outside and to provide 
output for other systems” (Alderfer, 2011: 136-137). 
This paper, mainly based upon the first author’s Doctor of Business 
Administration research project, focuses on the interaction of MFIs and the institutional 
context in which they operate. We argue that selective isomorphism through a choice on 
boundary permeability can assist in restoring trust in MFIs. The paper is organized as 
follows. Firstly, we offer extent literature review of MFIs, which are the principal unit 
of analysis for the purpose of this paper, with an emphasis on the relevance of trust, 
isomorphism and boundary permeability for operating in a regulated financial system. 
This is followed by proposing an analytical framework. After a description of our 
research methods, we present the results. Finally, in conclusion we discuss our results in 
relation to the proposed framework and offer direction for future research. 
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TRUST AND MULTINATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Multinational financial institutions 
MNCs can be traced back to ancient history, while the first MFIs appeared 
during the Middle Ages (see Wilkins, 2005). As Chandler and Mazlish (2005) point out, 
definitions on MNCs differ in perspective (e.g. geographical presence, private vs. public 
ownership, type of forms and practices). For this paper, the UNCTAD definition as 
cited by Roach (2005: 24) will be used: “an entity composed of a parent enterprise that 
controls the assets of entities in countries other than its home country plus the foreign 
affiliates of that parent enterprise”. Within the MNC organizational structure, the 
interdependence between the headquarters and its overseas subsidiaries is a key 
characteristic (Kostava and Roth, 2003). This interdependence varies according to the 
models of MNCs, namely international, multinational, global and transnational (Bartlett 
and Ghoshal, 2002). Due to the MNCs’ global business expansion and their complex 
organizational structure, the corporate governance of MNCs is increasingly under 
scrutiny. Sun, Stewart and Pollard’s (2011: 17) definition of corporate governance (“a 
systemic set of legal, cultural and institutional arrangements, which determine how the 
corporation is governed, for what purpose and for whose interests”) focuses on the 
various stakeholders of a corporation. Stakeholders of MNCs include both home and 
host country regulatory authorities. As Birkinshaw (2000) contends, the growing 
influence of MNCs can even overshadow nation states on the development of their 
economies. Chandler and Mazlish (2005) argue that MNCs do not jeopardize the 
authority of nation states, but acknowledge that the trans-border nature of their activities 
create challenges from a governance and regulatory perspective. They refer that MNCs 
have dealt with this matter through an effort towards greater transparency. Roach (2005) 
elaborates that transparency and accountability to all stakeholders form the basis for 
alignment of the behaviour of MNCs with society at large. He concludes that this 
alignment with the objectives of all stakeholders will not only require self-imposed 
actions at MNCs, but also national and international regulations.  
Due to the specific role of MFIs in the economic development of home and host 
countries (Green, Kirkpatrick and Murinde, 2005), increased scrutiny as regards 
transparency and accountability is required. While according to Jones (1995), MFIs 
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were historically seen as a contributing force to the society of a host country (see 
Wilkins, 2005), the consequences of the recent crisis demonstrated that this positive 
influence should no longer be taken for granted. The public debate on the crisis has 
emphasized the notion of trust at various levels, ranging from the financial system at 
large to financial institutions, such as banks. Roth (2009: 1; 4) argues that “a certain 
level of trust in and approval of the market economy is an important ingredient in 
ensuring the smooth running of the economic, political and social system”, but that 
“…citizens have been confronted with the fragility of their economic systems and their 
strong dependence on mutual trust”. At the height of the crisis, a representative from the 
European Central Bank contended that “building, preserving and valuing trust is not an 
unattainable ideal, but one that can be concretely translated into business objectives and 
practices” (Tumpel-Gugerell, 2008: 2). In response to the crisis, Brown (2009: 2) 
defended the overhaul of regulatory systems, emphasizing that “banks cannot assume 
that trust will return without significant change”. 
 
International regulatory systems 
Supervisory authorities have pursued reforms of national and international 
regulatory systems, while objectives for increased trust have been stated at 
supranational level. The G20 and FSB recognize that, first of all, mutual trust is 
required in the capability of local regulatory authorities to successfully implement 
common regulatory standards. As Carney (2014: 1; 3-4), the chairman of the FSB, 
points out in his letter on financial reforms to the G20 Leaders for their November 2014 
summit, “the world’s largest banks threatened the stability of the global system and 
their public bail-outs undermined both market discipline and a sense of fairness in our 
societies”. He states that, after the phase of implementing measures to strengthen 
regulatory standards across the world, to mitigate systemic risk in the financial system 
and to end the notion of “too big to fail in the banking sector”, the FSB continues to 
assess risks and vulnerabilities in the financial system, but also aims to “promote a 
system based on mutual trust and co-operation”. Carney clarifies that by “building 
mutual trust, we can realize fully the benefits of an open, integrated and resilient global 
financial system”. Furthermore, he elaborates that mutual trust depends on the 
consistency of local implementation of a common set of minimum international 
standards, as well as the capability of each country to deal with specific matters related 
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to its financial system and an increased deferral to local regulatory authorities in each 
jurisdiction. Carney contends that these standards need to “be implemented fully, 
consistently and in a timely way”. This message of persistence and consistency is 
reinforced by the G20 Leaders (2014: 2) in their joint statement on the Brisbane 
Summit, referring that “critical work remains to build a stronger, more resilient financial 
system” and concluding that “the task now is to finalise remaining elements of our 
policy framework and fully implement agreed financial regulatory reforms, while 
remaining alert to new risks”. 
 
Trust in MNCs 
Fukuyama (1995: 26) views trust as “the expectation that arises within a 
community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared 
norms, on the part of other members of that community”. Literature on trust in 
international joint ventures assists in gaining a deeper understanding on the afore-
mentioned expectation of behaviour. Madhok (2006: 32) argues that “trust is the 
perceived likelihood of the other [actor] not behaving in a self-interested manner”. 
Therefore, trust does not reflect the actual likelihood of behaviour, which according to 
Das and Teng (1998: 494) is a matter of control mechanisms, but rather the “perceived 
probability of desired behavior”. They define trust as “the degree to which the trustor 
holds a positive attitude toward the trustee’s goodwill and reliability in a risky exchange 
situation”. Literature identifies various dimensions of trust, including the notions of 
interpersonal and systemic trust (see Roth, 2009). While interpersonal trust represents a 
reflection on individuals, systemic trust indicates the confidence in institutions and the 
mode of production in a country. 
The afore-mentioned definitions on trust raise several issues that need to be 
considered with respect to trust in the relationship between MFIs and the communities 
in which they operate. Firstly, MFIs deal with a number of different communities in 
host countries, as acknowledged in the literature on the institutional context of MNCs 
(e.g. Guillén and Suárez, 2005; Westney, 2005). Secondly, the commonly shared norms, 
that Fukuyama refers to, depend on the culture in each country and community. Culture 
is defined by Schwartz (2007: 34) as “a rich complex of meanings, beliefs, practices, 
symbols, norms and values prevalent among people in a society”. Thirdly, the meaning 
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and levels of trust vary from country to country (Zaheer and Zaheer, 2006), which can 
also be linked to cultural differences. The next section focuses on trust that arises from 
isomorphism with the institutional context of MFIs. 
 
DEALING WITH ISOMORPHIC PRESSURES AT 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
 
Fostering trust through isomorphism 
The institutional context can be described by applying concepts from North 
(1990) and Scott (2008). According to North (1990), institutions determine the 
restrictions on human interaction, including actions that are prohibited as well as 
permitted under specific conditions. These constraints can be either formal or informal 
rules, jointly providing a structured and efficient basis for relationships. Scott (2008) 
distinguishes regulative, normative and culturally-cognitive pillars of society that are 
based upon different mechanisms. The regulative pillar focuses on coercive mechanisms 
(rules, laws and sanctions), while the normative pillar prescribes socially accepted 
behaviour and the cultural-cognitive pillar reflects the mimetic mechanism of creating a 
shared reference of meaning. The normative and cultural-cognitive pillars deal with the 
informal rules and the regulative pillar addresses the formal rules of society. According 
to institutional theory, an organization enhances the chances for survival by applying 
isomorphism, i.e. by incorporating patterns that are considered legitimate for the 
specific environment, resulting in increased internal and external commitment 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1991). DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 
66) view institutional isomorphism as a “process of homogenization” among 
organizations and refer to Hawley’s (1968) characterization of isomorphism as a 
“constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that 
face the same set of environmental conditions”. They elaborate on the notion of 
institutional isomorphism by concluding from literature (Carroll and Delacroix, 1982; 
Aldrich, 1979) that “organizations compete not just for resources and customers, but for 
political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness”. 
Since trust arises from “…the trustee’s goodwill and reliability in a risky exchange 
situation” (Das and Teng, 1998: 494), it can be argued that isomorphic pressures that 
result in increased legitimacy also foster trust. As Scott (2008: 61) claims, “legitimate 
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organizations are those established by and operating in accordance with relevant legal or 
quasi legal requirements”. If MFIs are in compliance with these requirements, the 
“perceived probability of desired behavior” (Das and Teng, 1998: 494) as assessed by 
stakeholders also should increase accordingly. In line with the afore-mentioned pillars 
of society, three types of isomorphism (coercive, mimetic and normative) can be 
distinguished. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 67) clarify that coercive isomorphism “results 
from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other 
organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society 
within which organizations function”. Organizations respond to the formal legal and 
technical pressures from governments (e.g. environmental regulations) by changing the 
organizational structure and behaviour (e.g. adopting technology that protects the 
environment). DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 68) refer to Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) 
argument that “as rationalized states and other large rational organizations expand their 
dominance over more arenas of social life, organizational structures increasingly come 
to reflect rules institutionalized and legitimated by and within the state”. DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991) contend that organizations also impose common policies and procedures 
on their subsidiaries (e.g. standard operating procedures, reporting requirements). Van 
der Stede (2003) refers to this type of coercive isomorphic pressures as “intracorporate 
isomorphism”. Examples at MFIs are accounting policies and corporate requirements to 
comply with anti-money laundering laws in home and host countries. 
The immediate response to the crisis, from both governments as well as parent 
companies, was exercising further “coercive authority”. Das and Teng’s perspective 
(1998: 495) implies that there are conceptual limitations to the impact of coercive 
isomorphism on the level of trust: “because trust involves a positive attitude about 
others’ motivations, conceptually, it is not about influencing and affecting others’ 
behavior but is about believing that others will perform whatever serves the trustor’s 
best interests, even in the absence of control”. Moreover, uncertainty in the business 
environment also increased significantly during the crisis, which fosters a second type 
of isomorphism. DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 69-70) state that “uncertainty is also a 
powerful force that encourages imitation”, resulting in mimetic isomorphism in order 
for “organizations…to model themselves after similar organizations in their field that 
they perceive to be more legitimate or successful”. It should be noted that “the modeled 
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organization may be unaware of the modeling or may have no desire to be copied”. 
MFIs may foster mimetic isomorphism at foreign subsidiaries to quickly achieve an 
adequate degree of legitimacy in host countries. Although this approach to implement a 
similar organizational structure and behaviour according to local benchmarks may be 
effective in countries with strict regulatory requirements, a debate could be held 
whether the similarity of business models at MFIs contributed to the crisis. The third 
type of isomorphism reflects “normative pressures” based upon mechanisms of 
professionalization (e.g. through university education, professional networks). 
DiMaggio and Powel (1991: 70-73) claim that “professions are subject to the same 
coercive and mimetic pressures as are organizations”. They conclude by referring to 
Perrow (1974) that professionalization may result in “a pool of almost interchangeable 
individuals”, whose common approach may reduce differences in “organizational and 
professional behavior” across different organizations. It can be questioned whether 
normative pressures at MFIs also impacted the crisis since e.g. investment bankers 
reflect a highly professionalized group of employees. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) 
contend that these isomorphic processes arguably enhance the efficiency of 
organizations, but may improve effectiveness (e.g. staff recruitment). 
 
Multiple institutional contexts: home and host countries 
The institutional context differs for each host country in which the MNCs’ 
national subsidiaries are located (Ghoshal and Westney, 2005; Westney, 2005). 
Birkinshaw (2000) contends, by referring to Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), Prahalad and 
Doz (1987) and Westney (1994), that MNCs’ subsidiaries are subject to isomorphic 
forces from both the parent company as well as the societies in which they operate. 
Contingency-based research on MNCs provides analytical frameworks to assess 
alignment of the desired behaviour both at parent company level in the home country, as 
well as foreign subsidiary level. Chenhall (2003: 160) summarizes contingency-based 
literature on management control systems, stating that managers attempt “to adapt their 
organizations to changes in contingencies in order to attain fit and enhanced 
performance”. These contingencies vary e.g. from environment and technology to 
culture. Chenhall refers that Lawrence and Lorsch’s framework (1967) on 
differentiation and integration contributed to contingency-based research. Further, 
according to Bartlett (1986), the theoretical development on MNCs also built on the 
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foundation of the differentiation and integration logic (see Ghoshal and Westney, 2005). 
More specifically, Ghoshal and Westney (2005: 3) argue that Prahalad’s (1975) 
“integration and responsiveness” framework (enhanced by Doz, 1979 and Bartlett, 
1979) identifies “forces for global integration” and “national differentiation”. These 
forces can be seen as isomorphic pressures aimed at increasing legitimacy within the 
institutional context of MNCs in home and/or host countries. Westney (2005: 59) 
clarifies that the transnational MNC as mentioned above “is not subject either to strong 
home or host country effects”, consistent with Perlmutter’s (1969) notion of geocentric 
MNCs. Trompenaars and Woolliams (2003) propose a framework for MNCs to deal 
with cross-cultural differences between home and host countries (reconciling 
universalistic and particularistic approaches). Van der Stede (2003) focuses on the 
notion of “intracorporate isomorphism” as a result of parent company effects 
(convergence) versus the adjustment of management control systems to the local culture 
(divergence). He argues, by referring to Granlund and Lukka (1998), that intracorporate 
isomorphism towards uniform management control systems has not been subject to 
extensive research. As Roach (2005: 37) describes, a recent school of thought in 
corporate governance addresses a focus on “internalizing the externalities”, providing 
stakeholders the formal or informal opportunity to influence MNCs’ behaviour. Since 
the various isomorphic pressures can be identified, they conceptually can be assessed at 
the boundaries between the internalities and externalities. Ghoshal and Westney (2005) 
contend that organizations need to effectively manage the exchanges that occur at the 
boundary between the organization and the environment. The next section will deal with 
managing isomorphism at the boundaries that separate MFIs from the institutional 
context in home and host countries. 
 
MANAGING BOUNDARY PERMEABILITY WITH RESPECT 
TO FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES 
Isomorphism: a choice on boundary permeability 
Westney (2005: 61) quotes Powell (1988) on his statement that the MNCs’ 
context, subject to multiple isomorphic forces, requires “skilful management of 
boundary relations and conformity to the normative codes of the relational networks in 
which it participates”. Alderfer (2011: 136-137; 142) offers a theory on intergroup 
12 
 
dynamics within organizations that can assist in the management of the boundaries 
between MFIs and the institutional context (i.e. formal and informal rules) in host 
countries. In his view “boundaries separate an entity from its environment, they exert a 
centripetal force on the entity in order to hold the system together”. Simultaneously, 
boundaries “permit exchanges between an entity and its environment, they exert a 
centrifugal force on the entity by allowing the system to come apart enough to receive 
input from outside and to provide output for other systems”. He defines boundary 
permeability as “the ease with which energy, information, and matter enter and leave a 
focal group”. Applying Alderfer’s framework to the foreign subsidiaries of MFIs, 
management control systems can be underbounded, optimally bounded or overbounded 
for the state of the local environment. Boundaries with low permeability (relatively 
overbounded) safeguard a subsidiary in an unstable institutional context, while 
increased boundary permeability (relatively underbounded) allows a subsidiary to thrive 
in a benevolent context. Optimal boundary permeability maximizes the likelihood for a 
foreign subsidiary to survive and prosper in a specific institutional context. A high 
degree of boundary permeability implies that the foreign subsidiary is subject to strong 
local isomorphic forces, while relatively closed boundaries foster intracorporate 
isomorphism. 
 
The institutional context characterized by assessing formal and informal rules 
Guillén and Suárez (2005) review theoretical perspectives on characterizing the 
institutional context. Their approach that describes the political economy of foreign 
direct investment in a host country can be analysed together with the approach on 
comparative corporate legal traditions, resulting in an assessment of formal rules. 
Further, their analysis on cross-cultural frameworks assists in assessing informal rules 
in society, which can be complemented by the notion of social capital (see Fukuyama, 
1995). Guillén and Suárez’ research is consistent with Zucker’s (1986) components of 
the institutional basis of trust: “the legal, political, and social systems that support the 
monitoring and sanctioning of social behavior” (see Zaheer and Zaheer, 2006: 22). 
It can be argued that the formal rules of the institutional context in a host 
country, as characterized by government policy and the prevailing legal system, 
determine the regulative pillar of society. 
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Formal rules 
Guillén and Suárez distinguish two relevant properties of government policy: 
approaches towards development (export oriented vs. import substitution) and towards 
MNCs (permissive vs. restrictive). The combination on both dimensions determines the 
perspective on MNCs (e.g. partners vs. necessary evils), as well as the prevailing type 
of organizations (e.g. small and medium sized companies vs. state-owned corporations). 
Moreover, the type of government policy impacts the MFI’s institutional context, with 
emphasis on the characteristics of the regulatory systems in home and host countries. 
Comparative corporate legal traditions have been extensively studied (e.g. Mattei, 1997; 
Juriglobe, 2008), but the classification as proposed by La Porta et al. (1998) has been 
widely acknowledged. Guillén and Suárez emphasize the implications of La Porta et 
al.’s dimensions on protecting investor and creditor rights for corporate governance, 
ownership and financing structure. La Porta et al. (1998) distinguish five categories of 
legal systems, ranging from English and French to German, Scandinavian and the 
former socialist systems. The strength of investor/creditor protection and respective 
enforcement provide additional measures for assessing the benevolence of the formal 
rules in the host country of MFIs. 
 
Informal rules 
The informal rules of society characterize the normative and culturally-cognitive 
pillars of society. Several comprehensive frameworks have been developed on cultural 
dimensions (e.g. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; Inglehart-Welzer, 2010; Schwartz, 2007; 
Trompenaars and Woolliams, 2003). Based upon Schwartz’ definition on culture, an 
analysis of cultural dimensions can lead to conclusions on both the normative (norms 
and values) and cultural-cognitive pillars (shared meaning). While any of the cultural 
analysis frameworks can be applied, Inglehart and Welzer’s (2010) cultural map allows 
a straightforward interpretation on two statistically relevant dimensions (traditional vs. 
secular-rational and survival vs. self-expression values). Inglehart and Welzer 
calculated scores on both dimensions for a range of countries, based upon data from the 
World Values Survey, which resulted in a cultural map that groups countries with 
similar scores. The first dimension represents the relative importance of religion, while 
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the latter reflects the evolution towards post-industrial societies in which self-expression 
is associated with an active participation in economic and political matters. Examples of 
groups of countries are “Protestant Europe” (e.g. Sweden, oriented towards self-
expression and secular-rational values) and “Latin-America” (e.g. Brazil, oriented 
towards traditional values and relatively neutral on the survival / self-expression 
dimension). 
According to Fukuyama (1995: 10), shared norms and values foster trust within 
a community and provide a basis for social capital, which is defined as “the ability of 
people to work together for common purposes in groups and organizations” (a concept 
developed by Coleman, 1998, cited by Fukuyama). Fukuyama (1995: 62) distinguishes 
three types of sociability (“family and kinship”, “voluntary associations outside 
kinship” and “the state”), which also can be linked to the prevailing type of economic 
organizations. The measurement of levels of interpersonal and systemic trust provides 
insight in the available social capital in a host country. Linking the concept of 
management control systems (Chenhall, 2003; Langfield-Smith, 1997; Van der Stede, 
2003) with the integration-responsiveness framework and boundary permeability, we 
propose a conceptual framework depicting a choice on boundary permeability which 
can lead to functional or dysfunctional outcomes at home (parent company) and/or host 
country (subsidary), as shown in Figure 1 below. 
 
------Insert Figure 1 about here------ 
 
The developed theoretical framework allows MFIs to assess the formal and 
informal rules in the society of a host country, so that it can decide on the degree of 
required isomorphism on both dimensions.  
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Data collection was conducted through semi-structured elite interviews 
(Bellamy, 2011) for which purposive sampling was applied (Silverman, 2010). The 
interview guides included for a specific phase of the project questions on “critical 
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incidents”, a term defined by Flanagan (1954) (see Bryman and Bell, 2007). The 
analysis of critical incidents allowed the identification and confirmation of themes 
underlying the research questions through in-depth insights in incidents at MFIs. Data 
and evidence were collected between September 2010 and March 2013 through 25 
semi-structured interviews with 21 participants. The interview participants (see 
appendix) were mainly active in the financial sector (18) and who were predominantly 
based in North America, Western and South-Eastern Europe (16). In order to enhance 
external validity of the research findings, additional interviews were conducted with 
professionals from other geographies (2 participants from Africa and Middle East) or 
active in other heavily regulated sectors (3 participants from the chemical and logistic 
sector). The secondary data sources included datasets on cultural dimensions from 
Inglehart and Welzer (2010; Wave 5), on dimensions of trust (as described by Roth, 
2009) from World Values Survey (2012) and on characteristics of legal systems from 
La Porta et al. (1998). Data analysis was performed with a range of tools, including 
Autoform (Nottingham Trent University application), Nvivo, Word and Excel and 
SPSS. Nvivo coding at nodes was used to confirm identified dimensions and 
consistency, while SPSS was applied for a specific part of the research project on 
boundary permeability. 
 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
The need and challenge to restore trust 
Institutional theory offers insight on aligning the “perceived probability of 
desired behavior” (Das and Teng, 1998: 494) of MFIs with the expectations of 
stakeholders in home and host countries. Restoring trust in the financial sector has been 
a significant challenge, as also recognized by an interview participant who questions the 
capability of financial institutions “to regain easily the trust of consumers and 
consequently of the supervisory authorities” (Participant 14).  
Senior managers acknowledge that trust from customers and the public at large 
in MFIs is perhaps even more important than merely complying with coercively 
imposed regulations. An interview participant in the research project refers that during 
the crisis: 
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“The biggest breach in trust has been between the banks and the general public…  
many banks in fact come to the conclusion now that losing the trust of … their 
clients is probably even more of an issue of concern than… the reinforced 
controls that they now experience from the local supervisors” (Participant 17). 
 
Formal rules are important yet insufficient 
Roach’s perspective (2005) that the alignment of MNCs’ behaviour with the 
objectives of all stakeholders requires self-imposed initiatives as well as additional 
regulations, is supported by an interview participant:   
“The financial sector… will continue to promote adjustment of behaviour through 
self-regulation, but I am convinced that [it] will prove to be insufficient and that 
the government will impose further regulations… The general feeling is too 
negative in society, which means that even very well structured points of view are 
not considered to be acceptable [by stakeholders]” (Participant 14). 
He furthermore underlines that the implementation of these regulations aimed at 
strengthening the financial system requires a joint effort of MFI and regulators:  
“… I think that the financial sector needs to take responsibility to react in the most 
appropriate manner [to stricter regulations]. I am an advocate for very strong 
supervisory authorities that have the capability to fulfil that role, [and that] are very 
professional in order to enter a dialogue [with MFIs]” (Participant 14). 
The crisis has demonstrated that coercive isomorphism at MFIs has not been 
sufficient to avoid major breakdowns in corporate governance. Coercive isomorphism 
to enforce compliance with regulations is always an option for authorities, but the 
question arises whether this is satisfactorily effective to restore trust in the financial 
sector. An interview participant clarifies this point: 
“Of course, I can’t predict twenty years into the future, but during the next five 
years regulations will become stricter. …Certain events occurred that are now 
being regulated, ...it is an easy solution to implement rules that you can tick-off, 
but it won’t be the real solution; we are dealing with a culture that needs to 
change, which you can’t change just through regulation” (Participant 10). 
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Informal rules 
Comments from an interview participant illustrate the importance of assessing 
informal rules (e.g. cultural dimensions and social capital) for boundary management: 
“If you are going in a country where… trust, confidence is not high…, and you 
may not know that, so if you think about that... the social fabric of the society, 
then you can come to some very important conclusions” (Participant 16). 
“… at the end of the day, if you work in a country [where] you can’t really trust 
the people…then you are going to close the boundaries. If you are working in a 
country [where] you know people are trustworthy, almost would say with high 
principles, then you can certainly open the boundaries much more” (Participant 
16). 
 
Normative isomorphism 
As DiMaggio and Powell (1991) point out, isomorphic pressures are not 
mutually exclusive. This perspective is illustrated by a quote from an interview 
participant which reflects a combination of coercive and normative isomorphism: 
“Professional behaviour in [country A] is very [much] regulated; ... there is a 
number of additional regulations that you have to comply with, and therefore… 
that basically translates … into management controls to make sure that that 
[professional behaviour] is actually happening in compliance with the 
regulations” (Participant 2). 
 
Isomorphism and managing boundary permeability 
Since isomorphic pressures can be either formal or informal in nature, an MFI 
needs to assess the boundary permeability of the institutional context on formal and 
informal rules. It can be argued that optimal boundary permeability on both dimensions 
does not only foster legitimacy but also trust of stakeholders. 
An interview participant emphasizes the relevance of these dimensions for the 
perception that stakeholders have of the corporate behaviour of MFIs: 
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“When you talk about government policy, legal systems, governance and so forth, 
you are talking about issues that … are very [much ] linked to reputational risk, 
[which] …has to do with …the breakdown of rules that ... should not be broken 
and will affect the company in terms of the way people look at it” (Participant 6). 
The importance of consistent corporate behaviour is acknowledged by a number 
of participants, which can be linked to the notions of transparency and accountability: 
“I think [that] as an acknowledgement that management has a responsibility, … the 
corporate structure, here and abroad basically is much more, interested in assuring 
the shareholders and the investors, as well as the community, that management is 
doing a responsible financial job” (Participant 11). 
“I think that the first requirement … is to create transparency… in all their control 
systems, to create transparency in its financial statements, to create transparency in 
the way we apply … rules and regulations, transparency in the way we operate 
locally” (Participant 17).  
The emphasis on transparency and accountability is also reflected in the internal 
and external communication strategy of MFIs: 
“You have to explain a lot as a company; external communications have become 
more and more important [than] a couple of years ago, in order to explain why you 
choose to do something, or choose to do something in a different way, or choose not 
to do something” (Participant 17). 
 “I insist everywhere that, as a matter of principle, we are fully transparent…and we 
always have only one approach on the type of management controls at our 
international subsidiaries…, which also avoids surprises” (Participant 14). 
It should be noted that MFIs need to ensure consistent corporate behaviour 
across both home and host countries in order to meet stakeholder expectations: 
“[If] the way you act in one country from a moral perspective differs completely 
from a country in another part of the world; … [then] you simply cannot explain 
that …to your stakeholders in your home country” (Participant 17). 
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He elaborates that local management needs to understand the requirements at 
both subsidiary and parent company level:  
“…a lot of these local managers …apply local rules or regulations...and… are 
completely surprised…that their local operation run by them, in a locally acceptable 
manner, is scrutinized and is heavily attacked by stakeholders in the home country of 
a company” (Participant 17). 
A structured assessment of the formal rules in home and host countries may 
assist in determining the most appropriate manner to “internalize the externalities”.  
 
A choice of market entry 
Finally, MFIs may desire to, but are not obliged to operate in certain host 
countries. A comment from an interview participant underlines the importance of 
government policy for the nature of the institutional context in which MFIs operate: 
“…in the practice of business, there are two principal factors that come into force 
…, considering the entry into a business relationship. Those two factors which are 
somewhat equivalent, but may vary in emphasis as time goes on are: economics and 
political. To the extent that, on a cross-country basis, both the political and the 
economic [factors] are in balance and positive, the growth of business between the 
countries … becomes greater” (Participant 11).  
An interview participant phrases the importance of assessing the institutional 
context as follows: 
“It would be to the benefit of the corporation…that goes to a foreign country, to 
know beforehand … what is the impact of the cultural and informal rules, or even 
the formal rules of the country” (Participant 20). 
He elaborates that: 
“You might even come up with something that is completely conflicting with your 
basic rules and principles. And, that could lead you to the decision to change your 
mind and not enter the market” (Participant 20). 
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This view is shared by another interview participant, underlining the importance 
of consistent corporate behaviour across home and host countries: 
“If the morals in the host country are…too far apart from the morals that they 
[MNCs] have to comply in their home country, then they simply decide to stop the 
operations in the host country” (Participant 17). 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The recent crisis has triggered a debate about the governance of the global 
financial system, with a focus on the trust of key stakeholders in the financial sector. At 
the national level, governments have proceeded with regulatory reforms. At the 
international level, the importance of trust in the financial system has been further 
emphasized by supranational bodies (e.g. FSB, G20). However, restoring trust between 
MFIs and their public and private stakeholders is a complex matter because of the 
nature of trust. MFIs, as large MNCs, can influence the economic development of some 
countries and can even create challenges to their ability to implement reforms. As a 
result, restoring trust cannot be achieved simply by complying with government 
regulations without adequate changes in organizational behaviour within MFIs and 
adjustment of their trust relationship with key stakeholders in both home and host 
countries. Two themes stand out from our analysis and findings that contribute to our 
understanding of the trust relationship that enables or impedes MFI subsidiaries’ 
performance in the host country environment. The first is institutional isomorphism, 
which reflects a process of institutional and human interactions according to formal and 
informal rules and constraints. The second is intracorporate isomorphism within the 
MFI, reflected in the level of boundary permeability of management control systems 
that enables and limits the impact of institutional isomorphic pressures.  
Our findings show that formal rules are important yet insufficient. The initial 
response to the crisis from governments and parent companies resulted in more coercive 
authority, through more stringent banking regulations and internal procedures. The aim 
to achieve institutional isomorphism through coercive formal rules and normative 
regulations cannot be accomplished without the process of informal mimetic 
isomorphism through human interactions between MFIs and their key stakeholders. For 
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MFIs, restoring trust with their customers and the public at large through mimetic 
isomorphism and intracorporate isomorphism is equally important as compliance with 
coercively imposed regulations. MFIs need to reinforce relationships with their key 
stakeholders through the identification and management of the boundaries. Managing 
boundary permeability requires MFIs’ management control systems to be sensitive to 
the host country institutional environment, including social capital and cultural 
dimensions. On the one hand, a lower degree of boundary permeability, i.e. relatively 
overbounded, helps MFIs to safeguard a subsidiary in an uncertain institutional context 
with unstable regulatory regimes and unclear institutional isomorphism. But conflict 
may occur when the host government attempts to exercise more coercive rules. On the 
other hand, a higher degree of boundary permeability, i.e. relatively underbounded, 
allows MFIs’ subsidiaries to prosper in a benevolent environment. However, the 
relationship between MFIs and the host government can be jeopardized if and when the 
environment and context changes. This leads to our notion of striking a balance between 
institutional and intracorporate isomorphism, as reflected in consistent corporate 
behaviour across home and host countries (e.g. on transparency and accountability) and 
strengthened relationships between MFIs and supervisory authorities in the application 
of national and international regulations. 
 
That being said, MFIs have options to choose whether to have subsidiary 
operations in certain countries; a matter of market entry choice. MFIs may desire to, but 
are not obliged to operate in certain host countries if the institutional context offers a 
less appropriate environment for a balance between institutional and intracorporate 
isomorphism. 
 
Limitations and implications 
This paper stems from a larger research project of the first author’s doctoral 
research. Therefore, the nature of literature and data is richer than what we have applied 
in this paper. The original research questions were stated from slightly different 
perspectives. We have managed to separate the theme of restoring trust through 
institutional and intracorporate isomorphism at MFIs’ subsidiary level from the research 
at a number of levels of the global financial system. As a result, we may have achieved 
the depth of analysis at the expense of a more integrated view. Another limitation is the 
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generalizability of our findings. By adopting a qualitative research method we have 
explored the richness of primary data and depth of participants’ responses, but the 
interviews are primarily confined to a limited number of MFIs and their subsidiaries in 
selected countries. Nonetheless, our theoretical development and empirical findings do 
offer generalizable results for the financial sector in general and for MFIs in particular. 
Optimization of boundary permeability between the MFIs as well as their subsidiaries 
and key institutional stakeholders in both home and host countries is critical for building 
and restoring a trust relationship. This insight adds value to our understanding of 
literature on the widely studied concept of institutional isomorphism. Further, we also 
contributed in reviving research on the under-researched notion of intracorporate 
isomorphism, which requires further research in the future. 
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APPENDIX 
Interview 
participant 
Location Industry focus Seniority 
1 North America Financial sector Middle management 
2 North America Logistics sector Top management 
3 North America Chemical industry Top management 
4 Middle East Financial sector Middle management 
5 North America Financial sector Top management 
6 Western Europe Financial sector Top management 
7 Western Europe Financial sector Top management 
8 Western Europe Chemical industry Middle management 
9 South Eastern Europe Financial sector Top management 
10 Western Europe Financial sector Top management 
11 North America Financial sector Top level external advisory 
12 Western Europe Financial sector Middle management 
13 Western Europe Financial sector Middle management 
14 Western Europe Financial sector Top management 
15 Western Europe Financial sector Middle management 
16 Western Europe Financial sector Top management 
17 Western Europe Financial sector Top management 
18 Western Europe Financial sector Middle management 
19 Africa Financial sector Top level external advisory 
20 South Eastern Europe Financial sector Top management 
21 South Eastern Europe Financial sector Middle management 
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FIGURE 1 BOUNDARY PERMEABILITY AND INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM 
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